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Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, Vol. 24, No. 4, October, 1993
The Administrative Claim Prerequisite to Suit
Against the United States Under the Admiralty
Jurisdiction Extension Act
CRAIG H. ALLEN*
INTRODUCTION
The Admiralty Jurisdiction Extension Act (AJEA)I confers federal
admiralty jurisdiction over all causes of action for vessel-caused
damage done or consummated on land. In extending admiralty
jurisdiction to land-based damage, the Act not only opened admiralty
courts to a new class of litigants, it also enlarged the range of possible
claims which could be brought against the United States under the
Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA)2 or the Public Vessels Act (PVA).3 At
the same time, however, an important prerequisite to suit against the
government was incorporated into the AJEA that is absent from the
SAA or PVA: where an injured party's cause of action arises under
the AJEA, the Act provides that no suit may be filed against the
United States until six months after the individual has filed an
administrative claim with the responsible federal agency. Compliance
with the administrative claim requirement is jurisdictional; failure to
satisfy the requirement will result in dismissal of an injured party's
suit.4
This article examines the provisions of the AJEA and the statute's
effect on the Suits in Admiralty Act and Public Vessels Act. It next
identifies the causes of action against the United States which may
arise under the AJEA. Finally, the article describes the elements of
*Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Coast Guard; J.D., University of Washington (1989);
Member, Oregon Bar.
The views expressed are those of the author alone and should not be construed as
representing the views of the Commandant of the Coast Guard or any other agency of
government.
146 U.S.C. app. § 740 (1988).
246 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-752 (1988).
146 U.S.C. app. H4 781-790 (1988),
4See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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an administrative claim and the requirements for presentment of such
claims.
I.
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION OVER TORTS
The Constitution confers jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime
cases on the federal courts.5 Admiralty jurisdiction extends to both
contract and tort cases. A tort is maritime and therefore within the
federal admiralty jurisdiction if it meets the "locality plus" test
established by the Supreme Court in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v.
City of Cleveland.6 Under that test, a tort is maritime if: 1) it occurs
on the navigable waters or high seas (the locality prong),7 and 2) the
wrong bears a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity
(the nexus prong). 8
A. Congressional Extension of the Locality Prong
Historically, maritime torts have been deemed to "occur" not
where the wrongful act was committed, but where the impact of that
act or omission produced the injury. 9 Before enactment of the AJEA,
the Supreme Court narrowly construed the "occurrence" definition
in the locality prong of admiralty jurisdiction. In The Plymouth,10 the
Court was faced with the question whether a claim for damage to a
wharf and other land structures which occurred when a fire spread
5The federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is established by Art. III § 2 of the U.S.
Constitution and implemented by acts of Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988).
6409 U.S. 249, 1973 AMC 1 (1972); see generally, Annot., Admiralty Jurisdiction: Maritime
Nature of Tort-Modem Cases, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 105.
7A narrow exception to the locality test has been recognized in claims for tortious
interference with maritime employment opportunities. Carroll v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co.,
512 F.2d 4, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1975); see also Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv. Co., 653 F.2d 1057
(5th Cir. 1981). But see Smith v. Pan Am Corp., 684 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1982) (maritime tort
jurisdiction exists only upon finding of locality and nexus).
8Annot., supra note 6. The party seeking to invoke admiralty jurisdiction must show a
substantial relationship between the activity giving rise to the incident and traditional maritime
activity. Sisson v. Ruby, 110 S. Ct. 2892, 2897, 1990 AMC 1801, 1806 (1990). The "activity"
which is examined is the general conduct from which the incident arose. Id.
9Howmet Corp. v. Tokyo Shipping Co., 320 F. Supp. 975 (D. Del. 1971). Occasionally, in
personal injury suits, the court will follow the "place of the wrong" test. The place of the wrong
is where the negligent party's act affects the victim. The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649, 652
(1935).
'°Hough v. Western Transp. Co. (The Plymouth), 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36 (1866) ("The
jurisdiction of the admiralty does not depend upon the fact that the injury was inflicted by the
vessel, but upon the locality-the high seas, or navigable waters-where it occurred.").
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from a vessel to the structures was cognizable in admiralty. The
Court answered in the negative, ruling that no tort was maritime and
therefore within admiralty's jurisdiction unless the substance and
consummation of the tort both occurred on navigable waters."' The
reach of admiralty jurisdiction in such cases is unaffected by the fact
that the negligent activity may have occurred on land.12
Application of the Court's narrow locality rule occasionally re-
sulted in anomalous and inequitable results for injured parties.
Following a vessel-bridge allision, for example, the vessel owner had
a cause of action in admiralty for damages to the vessel; however, the
bridge owner-whose damage had not "occurred" on navigable
waters-was relegated to common law courts and remedies.1 3
In 1948, Congress resolved the anomaly by enacting the Admiralty
Jurisdiction Extension Act (AJEA),14 which extended federal admi-
ralty jurisdiction to injuries or property damage occurring on land
provided they were caused by a vessel on navigable waters.15 The
AJEA statutorily overruled the Supreme Court's narrow locality test
for federal admiralty jurisdiction over torts articulated in The Ply-
mouth.
The Supreme Court has left open the question whether torts which
would otherwise be cognizable under the AJEA must also satisfy the
nexus prong for admiralty jurisdiction.1 6 Commentators and some
courts have urged that in the absence of clear congressional direction
to the contrary, the nexus requirement should be imposed on torts
IIld. at 36 ("Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not,
if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty jurisdiction.").
12E.g., In re Gypsum Carrier, Inc. (The Pacific Carrier), 489 F.2d 152, 1974 AMC 227 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931 (1974) (smoke from a mill on shore obstructed navigation
thereby causing vessel to collide with bridge); Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144, 1976 AMC
284 (2d Cir. 1976) (alleged negligence of Coast Guard search and rescue controller on land
caused drowning); Global Lines, Inc. v. United States, 645 F. Supp. 783, 1987 AMC 530
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (alleged negligence by Coast Guard in granting pilot a license caused
grounding).
13See generally Annot., Validity, Construction, and Application of the Admiralty Jurisdic-
tion Extension Act (46 U.S.C.S. § 740), 14 A.L.R. Fed. 664 (discussing cases).
1462 Stat. 496, codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 740 (1988). The statute was given no formal title.
It is also referred to as the "Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act." The Act was held to be
constitutional in United States v. Matson Nay. Co., 201 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1953).
546 U.S.C. app. § 740 (1988), which reads in pertinent part:
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to and include
all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable
water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land.
16Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 677 n.7 (1982). Later, the Court also raised
the possibility that the nexus requirement may not apply if the tort occurs on the high seas. East
River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 1986 AMC 2027 (1986).
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falling within the locality test under the AJEA.17 However, such a
judicially-created additional requirement for AJEA jurisdiction is at
odds with the plain language of the Act itself, which specifically
embraces all claims for damage or injury caused by a vessel on
navigable waters. Moreover, judicial importation of a nexus require-
ment may undermine the strong national interest in uniformity of
treatment in vessel-caused damage cases that the AJEA was designed
to promote.18
The AJEA merely extended admiralty's jurisdiction; it did not
create any new causes of action. 19 Where a tort cause of action falls
within extended admiralty jurisdiction by application of the AJEA, a
number of important effects follow. The most obvious is that the Act
permits individuals whose vessel-caused injury occurs on land to
proceed in admiralty, invoking the benefits of the court's unique
procedures and remedies. 2° Second, by bringing such torts within
admiralty's jurisdiction, the AJEA ensures issues of liability, dam-
ages, contribution and indemnification will be determined by the
general maritime law, 2 1 unless the matter is determined to be "mar-
17S. Friedell, 1 Benedict on Admiralty § 173, at 11-41 (7th ed. 1975 & 1993 supp.); Crotwel
v. Hockman-Lewis, Ltd., 734 F.2d 767 (1lth Cir. 1984); Sohyde Drilling & Marine Co. v.
Coastal States Gas Prod. Co., 644 F.2d 1132, 1982 AMC 2644 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1081 (1981). In contrast, the District Court for Alaska, in determining which of the claims arising
from the grounding of the T/V Exxon Valdez were within the court's admiralty jurisdiction, first
applied the "locality plus" test to the claims for damage on the navigable waters, but in
applying the AJEA to the shoreside damage claims examined only the locality and the cause of
the damage. In re The Exxon Valdez, 1991 AMC 1482, 1484-86 (D. Alaska 1991).
'
8 Anomalies would arise if the court focused on the injured party's activity in determining
nexus, as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 561,
1975 AMC 416, 421 (9th Cir. 1974) ("the 'activity' whose relationship to traditional maritime
activity was to be examined was that of the injured party, not that of the tortfeasor."). Under
such a test landowners whose land use was related to some kind of maritime activity could
proceed in admiralty, while their neighbors whose use was not maritime-related could not. A
more reasonable approach would be one that found admiralty jurisdiction based simply on the
fact that the damages were proximately caused by a vessel on navigable waters. See In re The
Exxon Valdez, 1991 AMC at 1484-86.
19Jorsch v. LeBeau, 449 F. Supp. 485, 1988 AMC 1452 (N. D. l. 1978); Louisville & N.R.
Co. v. Arrow Transp. Co., 170 F. Supp. 597, 1959 AMC 1035 (N.D. Ala. 1959).
2046 U.S.C. app. § 740 (1988) ("In any such case suit may be brought in rem or in personam
according to the principles of law and the rules of practice obtaining in cases where the injury
or damage has been done and consummated on navigable waters.").2 1See Romero v. International Terminal Op. Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-61 (1959) (admiralty
jurisdiction confers upon the federal sovereign the power to determine which courts will hear
maritime cases and the power to prescribe the substantive law governing disposition of those
cases): Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., Inc., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
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itime but local." 22 If the suit sounds solely in admiralty and is brought
under the court's maritime jurisdiction pursuant to the AJEA, there is
no right to a jury trial. 23
B. Causes of Action Which Fall Within The AJEA
In determining whether causes of action for property damage or
personal injury arising from a maritime incident are cognizable under
the AJEA the following three part analysis should be followed. First,
determine whether the damage or injury was proximately caused by
a vessel located on navigable waters. 24 Second, determine whether
the damage or injury was done or consummated on land.25 Third, to
identify the universe of possible defendants, look for all causative
conduct, whether committed on shore or on navigable waters.
1. Direct Claims
Federal courts broadly construe the terms of the AJEA to include
shoreside damage or injuries caused not only by the vessel, but also
by her tackle or appurtenances. 26 For example, in Gutierrez v.
Waterman Steamship Co., 27 the Supreme Court held that the AJEA
extended admiralty jurisdiction to a suit against a vessel by a
longshoreman who, while working on the dock, was injured when he
slipped on cargo which had spilled from a broken and defective bag
being unloaded from the vessel. In remarkably broad language, the
Court held:
We think it sufficient for the needs of this occasion to hold that the case
is within the maritime jurisdiction under 46 U.S.C. § 740 when, as here,
2Where the matter is maritime but local the court may apply the substantive law of the state
in which the tort occurred. Askew v. American Waterways Op., Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973);
Royal Ins. Co. of America v. Pier 39 Ltd. Partnership, 738 F.2d 1035, 1986 AMC 2392 (9th Cir.
1984).
23Callahan v. Cheramie Boats, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La 1974).
2Although the AJEA merely states that the damage must be "caused" by the vessel, courts
have held there must be a showing of proximate causation. Margin v. Sea-Land Services, Inc.,
812 F.2d 973,975 (5th Cir. 1987); Pryor v. American President Lines, 520 F.2d 974, 979 (4th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1055 (1976).
25Vessel-caused damage or injury consummated on the navigable waters would fall within
admiralty jurisdiction without invocation of the AJEA.
26The Act was not intended to affect the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988), Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 1969
AMC 1967 (1969), or the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-768 (1988),
Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
27373 U.S. 206, 1963 AMC 1649 (1963).
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it is alleged that the ship owner commits a tort while or before the ship
is being unloaded, and the impact of which is felt ashore at a time and
place not remote from the wrongful act.28
In Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law,29 the Court limited the potential
reach of the AJEA that might otherwise have resulted from a literal
reading of its earlier holding in Gutierrez. In Victory Carriers the
Court held that the claim by a longshoreman injured while driving an
allegedly defective forklift on a dock to load a ship was not within
extended federal admiralty jurisdiction because the stevedore-owned
forklift was not an appurtenance of the ship, nor was it under the
control of or on the ship.30
Courts have found AJEA jurisdiction over shoreside injuries aris-
ing out of negligent conduct by a vessel's officers or crew members
while operating the vessel, even where the vessel was not a direct
cause of the injury. 31 For jurisdiction to exist, the crewman must have
been aboard the vessel and in her service at the time of the negligent
act, and the injury must not have been too remote from the act in time
or location. 32
Shoreside property damage claims arising from ship collisions,
groundings, pollution discharges, or vessel wakes are within the
federal admiralty jurisdiction by virtue of the AJEA.33 "Shoreside"
damage includes all damage to real property.34 Damage to shellfish
beds is included. 35 At least one court held that the term also includes
small craft and all items of personal property along the shoreline. 36
The AJEA has been invoked successfully in claims alleging damage to
property on shore caused by overspray while a vessel on navigable
28373 U.S. at 210, 1963 AMC at 1653.
29404 U.S. 202, 1972 AMC 1 (1971).
30404 U.S. at 210-11, 1972 AMC at 8-9.31Duluth Superior Excursions, Inc. v. Mahela, 623 F.2d 1251 (8th Cir. 1980) (extending
admiralty jurisdiction to claim by cruise ship passenger struck on shore by car driven by a
fellow passenger who became intoxicated during the "booze cruise").321d. at 1253 n.5; Clinton v. Joshua Hendy Corp., 285 F.2d 199, 1961 AMC 727 (9th Cir.
1960).
33Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1031 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc),
cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France, 699
F.2d 909, 913 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
3in re New Jersey Barging Corp., 168 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (admiralty law, not
state law, controls damage issues in such cases).35Hahn v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Va. 1963) (oyster beds damaged by stranded
vessels).
36Slasky v. Atlas Tank Proc. Corp., 120 F. Supp. 225 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds,
208 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1953).
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waters was being painted, 37 and to claims -for personal injury or
property damage caused by smoke or other noxious emissions from
vessels. 38
If negligence in land-based activities of the United States caused or
contributed to any "shoreside" damage caused by a vessel on
navigable waters, the resulting claim against the United States would
lie within admiralty's jurisdiction by application of the AJEA. 39
Although direct claims for shoreside damage may be brought against
the United States in such circumstances, and liability would be joint
and several, 4° often, injured parties proceed against the vessel and
her owner, who may then seek contribution or indemnification from
the United States. 4'
Historically, the AJEA provided the jurisdictional basis for claims
against the federal government for damage by oil contamination or
the resulting cleanup operations to shorelines, cables, piers, bridges,
fixed fish traps, fish hatcheries or weirs (if constructed in a way that
renders them an extension of land), water intakes, and shellfish beds
where the claim alleged that the damage was caused by the joint fault
of a vessel on navigable waters and the United States. 42 The AJEA
does not, however, extend to pollution damage to the navigable
waters themselves or the resources therein. Such damages are within
admiralty's jurisdiction without implication of the AJEA. 43
2. Restitutional and Third Party Claims
The AJEA applies not only to direct claims against the vessel
owner or operator, but to all claims arising out of vessel-caused
37Motors Ins. Co. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
3Nissan Motor Co. v. Maryland Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 544 F. Supp. 1104, 1983 AMC
663 (D. Md. 1982).
39See infra notes 45-46 and Part II. For example, any cause of action against the federal
government which alleges that vessel-caused shoreside damage was caused in whole or in part
by the vessel operator's reasonable reliance on faulty government charts, weather warnings, or
other navigational information, or the owner's reliance on Coast Guard licensing or inspection
activities, would lie in admiralty by virtue of the AJEA.
4°See Simeon v. T. Smith & Sons, Inc., 852 F.2d 1421, 1428 (5th Cir. 1988).41For an excellent examination of the maritime law governing contribution and indemnifi-
cation see Yeates, Dye & Garcia, Contribution and Indemnification in Maritime Litigation, 30
S. Tex. L. Rev. 215 (1989). The authors highlight the enormous risk a non-settling defendant
may incur in such cases. Id. at 244-49.42Most of these claims will now be governed by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which requires
the President to develop claim presentment and processing procedures. Oil Pollution Act of
1990 § 1013, P.L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990) [hereinafter "OPA 1990"].
43California by Dept. of Fish & Game v. S.S. Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922 (C.D. Cal.
1969).
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damage or injury, regardless of the parties sought to be charged.44 Thus,
the AJEA may confer admiralty jurisdiction over an independent suit for
indemnity or contribution among joint tortfeasors, even though the joint
tortfeasor to be charged neither owned nor operated an involved vessel
and committed no actionable conduct on navigable waters.45
Claims for contribution or indemnification for any claims settled or
judgments entered relating to the damages cognizable under the
AJEA are also cognizable under the Act. 6 It is therefore critical that
parties anticipating a possible claim against the government for
contribution or indemnification file a timely administrative claim
which meets the requirements of the AJEA if the underlying direct
cause of action may fall within the AJEA. 47 Similarly, counterclaims
and third party claims relating to damages falling within the AJEA are
subject to the Act's administrative claim requirement.
3. Limitations on Jurisdiction
Federal admiralty jurisdiction over cases alleging vessel-caused
damage consummated on land is not exclusive of state courts, at least
with respect to sea-to-shore pollution.48 However, where the suit is
brought against the federal government, it must be borne in mind that
the United States has not consented to domestic suits in other than
federal courts, and any liability of the United States for maritime torts
is governed by federal law.49 Moreover, even though suits against the
government arising from vessel-caused damage occurring on land
may be brought in admiralty, the remedies available to the plaintiff
may be limited by applicable sovereign immunity waiver statutes. 50
"Gebhard v. S.S. Hawaiian Legislator, 425 F.2d 1303, 1970 AMC 2056 (9th Cir. 1970); 1
Benedict on Admiralty, supra note 17, § 173, at 11-40.
45Fematt v. Los Angeles, 1% F. Supp. 89 (S.D. Cal. 1961), noted in 60 Mich. L. Rev. 20
(1961).
46See Gebhard v. S.S. Hawaiian Legislator, 425 F.2d at 1307 (AJEA extends to all claims
arising out of vessel-caused injury regardless of party to be charged).
47This conclusion is consistent with the principle that a party bringing an action for
indemnity or contribution should be accorded no greater right, and should meet the same
preconditions to suit, as the party for whom the direct cause of action is provided. Note,
however, that the statute of limitations rules regarding contribution and indemnification actions
may differ from those controlling direct causes of action. See infra note 75.
48Askew v. American Waterways Op., Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
49 Patentas v. United States, 687 F.2d 707, 713 (3d Cir. 1982).
5°See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741, 781 (1988) (public vessels and cargo not subject to
provisional remedies of arrest or action in rem); id. § 743 (libelant may elect to proceed in
accordance with the principles of an in rem action); id. §§ 743, 745, 782 (limitations on
prejudgment interest)..
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Causes of action for vessel-caused economic damages "done or
consummated on land" (or on navigable waters) that were not
accompanied by physical injury or property damage present a con-
tentious issue in admiralty litigation. Even though such economic
losses occurring on land are within admiralty's jurisdiction under the
AJEA, in most cases they must be dismissed because substantive
admiralty law controls, and the general maritime law denies recovery
for purely economic harm to third parties.5' The rule applies with
equal force to causes of action arising under the AJEA.52 The
government's waiver of sovereign immunity under the SAA/PVA, as
extended by the AJEA, is similarly limited by the rule. 53 Notwith-
standing the general maritime law rule in Robins Drydock, compen-
sation for purely economic losses resulting from vessel'caused pol-
lution may be statutorily authorized.5-
II.
EFFECT OF AJEA ON GOVERNMENT LIABILITY UNDER
PUBLIC VESSELS ACT AND SUITS IN ADMIRALTY ACT
Suits against the United States arising from maritime torts by
government employees or vessels are cognizable, if at all, only under
the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA) 55 or the Public Vessels Act (PVA).56
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) specifically excludes claims
which fall within the ambit of the SAA or PVA. 57 Where an alleged
tort by the government involves vessel-caused damage done or
consummated on land, the AJEA provides:
[tihat as to any suit against the United States for damage or injury done
or consummated on land by a vessel on navigable waters, the Public
5 1Robins Drydock v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 1928 AMC 61 (1927); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. MV
Bayou Lacombe, 597 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1979); Lynchburg Crossing, Inc. v. S.S. MfV City of
Port Allen, 1982 AMC 2072, 2074-75 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Arrow Transp.
Co., 170 F. Supp. 597 (D. Ala. 1959) (holder of usufructuary right in bridge damaged by vessel
has no cause of action under AJEA).
52Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MV Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1031 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc),
cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986).53See 46 U.S.C. app. § 742 (1988) (United States liable to same extent as private party would
be).
54E.g., OPA 1990, supra note 42, § 1002(b)(2); In re The Glacier Bay, 1990 AMC 739, 750
(Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act preempts general maritime law rule barring purely
economic losses).
5546 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-752 (1988).
5646 U.S.C. app. § 781-790.
-728 U.S.C. § 2680(d) (1988).
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Vessels Act or Suits in Admiralty Act, as appropriate, shall constitute
the exclusive remedy. 58
The SAA and PVA therefore provide the exclusive remedy for
maritime torts of the United States59 and its agents and employees
whose acts give rise to the claim, whether occurring on navigable
waters or-if caused by a vessel--on land.60
The AJEA only extends admiralty jurisdiction; it does not consti-
tute an independent waiver of sovereign immunity by the United
States. 61 The AJEA can thus be viewed as a statutory shift of the
federal government's tort liability for vessel-caused damage on land
from the FTCA to either the SAA or the PVA. An important result of
that shift is that actions brought under the AJEA are governed by
maritime law. 62
Difficult questions concerning application of the AJEA to suits
against the United States arise where the United States is not the
owner or operator of any involved vessel, but its land-based activities
allegedly caused or contributed to the casualty. An easily imagined
scenario might, for example, allege that Coast Guard negligence
ashore in inspecting an involved vessel or licensing her crew contrib-
uted to a grounding or collision resulting in pollution damage ashore.
The key issue in such a case is whether the cause of action against the
Coast Guard will be bootstrapped into the AJEA by the fact that the
damage upon which the suit is based was "caused by a vessel."
As used in the AJEA, the phrase "caused by a vessel" has not been
strictly construed. Indeed, Professors Gilmore and Black observed
long ago that, as interpreted by the courts in determining jurisdiction
under the Public Vessels Act, the word "caused" is "utterly Prote-
an" 63 and has been given an expansive meaning. In evaluating the
reach of the AJEA and the need to file an administrative claim every
5846 U.S.C. app. § 740 (1988).
59 1d.; Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144, 1146, 1976 AMC 284, 291 (2d Cir. 1976) (suit for
acts or omissions by Coast Guard shore-based search and rescue staff must be brought under
the SAA, not the FTCA); McCormick v. United States, 680 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1982).
6046 U.S.C. app. § 745 (1988).61Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 187 F.2d 777 (6th Cir. 1951); Port of Bremerton v. United
States, 1986 AMC 2870 (W.D. Wash. 1985); 1 Benedict on Admiralty, supra note 17, § 173, at
11-35.
62United States v. Matson Nay. Co. 201 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1953); California by Dept. of Fish
& Game v. S.S. Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
63G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty § 11-11, at 984 (2d ed. 1975). A prominent
example is Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 1945 AMC 265 (1945)
(damage resulting from ne gigence by public vessel's officers in directing another vessel
constitutes damage caused by vessel of United States).
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attorney should carefully consider the expansive interpretation of
"6causation" given by the court in J. W. Peterson Coal & Oil Co. v.
United States.64 The case involved suit against the United States and
the private owner/operator of a dredge under contract to the United
States for damages to the plaintiff's dock during dredging operations.
To avoid dismissal of his suit against the government, the plain-
tiff-who had not filed an administrative claim-argued that since the
alleged government negligence occurred entirely on land, and his
injury occurred on land, jurisdiction over the government should lie
under the FTCA.65 The court disagreed, however, holding that if the
government was negligent when it supplied the dredging contractor
with maps and information regarding river depths or dredging speci-
fications then the dock owner's claim against the government would
fall within admiralty jurisdiction by virtue of the AJEA.66 In a
still-valid holding with potentially far-reaching consequences, the
court concluded that, because the dock owner's claim against the
government stemmed from the government's alleged misdirection of
the vessel which caused the damage ashore, jurisdiction over the
cause of action arose under the AJEA.67
Up to this point, the court's reasoning was sound and consistent
with the majority view that a maritime tort is deemed to "occur"
where the injury is felt, 68 and that the maritime character of the tort
is unaffected by the fact that the tortious act occurred on land.69 In
the precedent-setting Pacific Carrier70 "smokestack" case, for exam-
ple, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals extended admiralty jurisdic-
tion to a suit against the owner of a smokestack whose emissions
unreasonably interfered with navigation, contributing to a vessel
allision with a bridge. The court readily found that claims by the
bridge owner against the vessel fell within admiralty jurisdiction by
virtue of the AJEA. In reasoning that surprised many, the court then
extended the logical application of the AJEA, holding that admiralty
jurisdiction also extended to the third party claim by the vessel
64323 F. Supp. 1198, 1202-03, 1970 AMC 1763, 1767-68 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
65At the time plaintiff's cause of action arose there was no administrative claim requirement
under the FTCA. Id. at 1203 n.5.
66Id. at 1201.
6 71d. at 1203; see also Penn Cen. Transp. Co. v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 1161 (D. Del.
1973) (suit against United States alleging damage to plaintiff's submarine cable caused by
dredging company under contract to government cognizable under AJEA).
68See supra note 9.
69See supra note 12.
7
°In re Gypsum Carrier, Inc. (The Pacific Carrier), 489 F.2d 152, 1974 AMC 227 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931 (1974).
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against the smokestack owner.71 The parallel between Peterson and
Pacific Carrier is evident: had the government operated the smoke-
stack in the Pacific Carrier case, it can be seen that the resulting claim
against the government for damages occurring on land caused by a
vessel would arise under the AJEA, just as did the claim against the
government in Peterson. The fact that the alleged negligence oc-
curred on land does not alter the outcome.
Unfortunately, the court's decision in Peterson later ran astray,
ruling that-even though the cause of action lay within the court's
admiralty jurisdiction-the SAA/PVA did not, at that time, provide a
remedy where the government neither owned nor operated the vessel
involved. Absent a remedy under the SAA/PVA, the plaintiff dock
owner was not barred from seeking relief under the FTCA.72 Later
courts have since ruled that no government vessel need be involved
for an admiralty claim to lie against the United States under the SAA
by application of the AJEA.73 Despite this now-discredited finish,
Peterson still stands for the proposition that all suits for vessel-caused
damages suffered on land that were caused at least in part by federal
government negligence committed on land fall within the AJEA. Any
such suit against the federal government must therefore be preceded
by a proper administrative claim.
III.
ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM REQUIREMENT FOR SUITS
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
The SAA and PVA, as extended by the AJEA, provide the sole
remedy for maritime torts by federal government-owned or operated
vessels, or by employees or agents of the federal government,
regardless of ownership of the involved vessels. 74 Both acts contain a
two year statute of limitations.75
71id. ("the fact that the agency said to have obstructed navigation here had a nonmaritime origin
is irrelevant to any issue since it caused izjury to a vessel then underway on navigable waters.").
72Peterson, 323 F. Supp. at 1203 (citing Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 95 F. Supp.
298 (D. Md.), rev'd, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951)).
73See, e.g., Hogge v. S.S. Yorkmar, 434 F. Supp. 715 (D. Md. 1977).
74 United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 176 n.14 (1976); McCor-
mick v. United States, 680 F.2d 345, 349 (5th Cir. 1982); Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974).
7546 U.S.C. app. §§ 745, 782 (1988). Determining when a cause of action for contribution or
indemnification arises can be problematic. Generally, a cause of action for contribution accrues on
the date of the casualty, and a cause of action for indemnification accrues when the party seeking
indemnity actually incurs the loss. Sea-Land, Inc. v. United States, 874 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1989);
Davis v. Newpark Shipbuilding & Repair, 659 F. Supp. 155, 1988 AMC 1262 (E.D. Tex. 1987).
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No suit may be brought against the United States absent compli-
ance with any procedures and satisfaction of any preconditions
imposed by the applicable statutory waiver of sovereign immunity. 76
Failure by the claimant to satisfy the administrative claim require-
ment deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction, requiring
dismissal of the case.77 Similarly, failure to file suit within the two
year statute of limitations under the SAA or PVA will ordinarily
result in dismissal. 78 Accordingly, injured parties whose claims
against the United States may arise under the AJEA must carefully
examine the Act's administrative claim requirements. 79
A. Administrative Claim Requirements Under the AJEA
Federal administrative claims procedures have served well for
nearly 50 years as a simple and inexpensive alternative to litigation.
In examining the requirement for an injured party to present an
administrative claim before litigation, claimants, the courts, and
agency personnel should be responsive to the renewed Congressional
mandate for expanded use of alternative dispute resolution methods,
including administrative claims.80
Where a cause of action against the government is cognizable under
the AJEA, the claimant must submit a' written notice of claim to the
agency responsible for the damage before filing suit in district court.81
The AJEA's administrative claim prerequisite is similar to the re-
quirements Congress later imposed on claimants whose cause of
76United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d
at 528.
77Loeber v. Bay Tankers, Inc., 924 F.2d 1340 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 78 (1991);
Keene Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
Dismissal on grounds of failure to comply with the administrative claim prerequisite is not a
dismissal on the merits, however; and the doctrine of res judicata will not bar a subsequent suit
if the claim requirement is satisfied within the statute of limitations period. Plyler v. United
States, 900 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1990); Price v. United States, 466 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Pa.
1979).
78See infra section III.D (describing equitable tolling).
79See generally L. Jayson, Handling Federal Tort Claims, ch. 17 (1991).
8°See The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, P.L. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736
(1990).
8146 U.S.C. app. § 740 states that:
no suit shall be filed against the United States until there shall have expired a period of six
months after a claim has been presented in writing to the Federal agency owning or
operating the vessel causing the injury or damage.
An exception is sometimes made for suits by seamen. See, e.g., Henz v. United States, 9
F.R.D. 291 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
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action arises under the FTCA. 82 If the cause of action arises directly
under the SAA or PVA, without invocation of the AJEA, there is no
requirement for an administrative claim, although claims are nearly
always submitted in such cases, as an alternative to immediate suit.8 3
In deciding whether an administrative claim must be filed, it is critical
in each case, and for each cause of action, to determine whether the
tort alleged properly lies within the AJEA. In the alternative, the
prudent attorney will file a timely, precautionary administrative claim
to guard against the possibility that a court may later find that the
AJEA controlled the cause of action.
Under established federal law, no affirmative relief may be ob-
tained from a sovereign in the absence of specific consent and
compliance with any conditions imposed by that grant. 84 Accord-
ingly, the provisions governing claims and suits against the federal
government contained in the AJEA are jurisdictional, 5 and the
plaintiff must plead and prove compliance with them.86 Courts may,
however, permit the plaintiff to amend the pleadings or supplement
the record where it appears that the plaintiff will be able to demon-
strate compliance with the administrative claim requirement.87
Upon motion, a district court must dismiss any suit where the
plaintiff failed either to: 1) comply with the Act's claim presentment
requirement, or 2) wait the mandatory six months after presentment
before filing suit.8 8 Both requirements must be met in time to fie suit
8228 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1988). The AJEA included an administrative claim requirement in
1948. In 1966, Congress incorporated a similar requirement into the FTCA. Before that date, the
claimant had the option of seeking administrative adjustment, but was not required to do so. L.
Jayson, supra note 79, § 315 n.5, at 17-3; Bermann, Federal Tort Claims at the Agency Level:
The FTCA Administrative Process, 35 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 509 (1983).
83Former Vice President Quayle's Commission on Competitiveness recommended amending both
statutes to add an administrative claim requirement, but the fate of the initiative is now doubtful.
"'United States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1939); State of Alaska v. O.S.
Lynn Kendall, 310 F. Supp. 433, 435 (D. Alaska 1970) ("Although a counterclaim may be asserted
against a sovereign by way of setoff or recoupment to defeat or diminish the sovereign's recovery,
no affirmative relief may be given against the sovereign in the absence of consent.").
85Loeber v. Bay Tankers, Inc., 924 F.2d 1340 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 78 (1991);
Department of Highways, State of Louisiana v. United States, 204 F.2d 630, 632 (5th Cir. 1953)
(citing United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941)).
8tSee Anderson v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (injured claimant bears
burden of proving he submitted necessary administrative claim).
87Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1981); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637 (9th
Cir. 1980).
gSLoeber v. Bay Tankers, Inc., 924 F.2d 1340 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 78 (1991);
Pacific Bell v. United States, 636 F. Supp. 312 (N.D. Cal. 1986). The six months begin to run
only after the claim is presented to the proper agency. 46 U.S.C. app. § 740 (1988) (claim must
he presented to agency owning the vessel); see Smith v. United States, 1989 AMC 1864, 1866
n.1 (9th Cir. 1989).
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within the two year statute of limitations. In contrast to the FTCA
administrative claim procedures contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a),8 9
under the AJEA the claimant must wait the mandatory six months
even if before that time the agency denies the claim.90 A second
important difference is that the two year statute of limitations under
the SAA/PVA is not tolled by filing an administrative claim, as it is
under the FTCA.91 This is true even if at the time of filing the
administrative claim with the federal agency the claimant believed
that its cause of action arose under the FTCA.92 Finally, although the
FTCA specifically waives the administrative claim requirement
where the cause of action is brought by way of a cross claim,
counterclaim, or third party complaint under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 93 no such exception is contained in the AJEA, SAA,
or the PVA.
B. Minimum Standards for Compliance With Claim Presentment
Requirement
The administrative claim requirements under the AJEA have been
equated by the courts with those contained in the FTCA.94 Several
justifications support this conclusion. First, both the AJEA and the
FTCA require that the injured party present a "claim" to the
appropriate agency. A consistent interpretation of the minimum
89Annot., Federal Tort Claims Act: Construction and Application of 28 U.S.C.S. § 2675(a),
as Amended in 1966, and Implementing Regulations, Requiring Presentation of Claim to, and
Denial of Claim by, Federal Agency Before Court Action Can be Instituted Against United
States, 13 A.L.R. Fed. 762.
9 9Pacfic Bell, 636 F. Supp. at 314-15. This requirement forces the claimant to present the
administrative claim not later than 18 months after the cause of action arises or risk running of
the statute of limitations before the mandatory six month wait has expired.
9 1T.J. Falgout Boats, Inc. v. United States, 508 F.2d 855, 858 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1000 (1975); Smith v. United States, 1989 AMC at 1868-69; Port of Bremerton v.
United States, 1986 AMC 2870, 2871-72 (W.D. Wash. 1985).
92Williams v. United States, 711 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1983). The outcome may well be different
if government personnel misled the claimant into believing the claim was cognizable under the
FTCA. See infra section uI.D.
9328 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1988). Only compulsory counterclaims are exempted. Northridge
Bank v. Community Eye Care, Inc., 655 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Chatham, 415
F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. Ga. 1976). Similarly, only third party actions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 14
seeking contribution or indemnification are exempt from the administrative claim requirement
under the FTCA. Rosario v. American Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 531 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir.
1976).
9'Keene Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836, 843 n.12 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Like the FTCA, the
AJEA requires submission of a notice of claim to the appropriate agency prior to filing suit in
the district court. [Plaintiff's] Amended Notice does not constitute an adequate "claim" under
the AJEA for the same reason that it fails to satisfy the FTCA notice requirements.") (dictum).
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elements of a "claim" is essential to agencies and, ultimately, to the
courts, which must evaluate claims arising under both statutes.
Second, since it may not be apparent at the time the claim is
presented which statute the cause of action arises under, it is to the
claimant's advantage to have a single standard for claims presentment
that is common to all relevant statutes. Third, the policy reasons
underlying the administrative claim requirement in federal statutes
are identical: to reduce the litigation burden on federal courts by
facilitating settlement of claims at the administrative level, decrease
the cost of processing claims, and promote fair and equitable treat-
ment of claimants. 95 Finally, by equating the claim presentment
requirements in the AJEA with those under the FTCA, courts may
draw on the growing body of federal case law and secondary sources
interpreting FTCA claim requirements. 96 For all of the foregoing
reasons, this article draws on FTCA claim presentment cases where
not inconsistent with cases decided directly under the AJEA.
The Department of Justice and all federal agencies that have been
delegated claims settlement authority each promulgate regulations
establishing their claims procedures. 97 Although an agency may
refuse to settle a claim which does not comply with its claims
regulations, strict compliance with the agency's regulations is not a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit.98
Following a casualty giving rise to causes of action by more than
one party, each party must submit an individual claim. 99 The federal
Anti-Assignment Act 1°0 prohibits transfer or assignment of a claim or
any portion of a claim against the United States before the claim has
been allowed and a warrant for the amount has been issued.
95See H. Rep. No. 1532, S. Rep. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1966 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2515, 2524.
96Note, Claims Requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act: Minimal Notice or Substantial
Documentation?, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1641 (1983); Note, The Art of Claimsmanship: What
Constitutes Sufficient Notice of a Claim Under the Federal Tort Claims Act?, 52 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 149 (1983); Annot., When Claim is Properly Presented to Federal Agency Under 28
U.S.C.S. § 2675(a) for Purposes of Satisfying Prerequisite to Suit Under the FTCA, 73 A.L.R.
Fed. 338.
97See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. Part 14 (1993) (Department of Justice); 32 C.F.R. Part 750 (1993) (U.S.
Navy); 32 C.F.R. Part 536 (1993) (U.S. Army); 33 C.F.R. Part 25 (1993) (U.S. Coast Guard).
"Warren v. United States, 724 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc). But see infra note 125
and accompanying text.
99See, e.g., Swiden v. United States, 581 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1983) (spouse must submit
separate claim for her loss of consortium arising from husband's injury); Susanin v. United
States, 570 F. Supp. 25 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
'°°31 U.S.C. § 3727 (1988). This prohibition applies only to voluntary assignments, not those
effected by operation of law, as in subrogation.
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The AJEA specifically requires that the notice of claim be in
writing. Oral notification does not meet the statutory requirement. 101
The claim need not be presented in or on any particular form to
satisfy the AJEA.102 However, for convenience, most agencies
request that claims be presented on the federal government's "Stan-
dard Form 95," and nearly all claimants do so. Administrative claims
must be presented in the name of the real party in interest and by
either that person or an authorized agent or representative. 103 Claims
for property damage must be presented by the owner.'04 Claims for
personal injury must be presented by the injured person. A claim for
wrongful death may be presented by the deceased's executor, estate
administrator, or other authorized person. An insurer may present a
claim as subrogee for a loss compensated by insurance. If the claim
is presented by or on behalf of a corporation, the claim should be
signed by a corporate officer, with a notation of the officer's title or
capacity. If presented by an attorney, agent or executor, the claim
should be presented in the name of the real party in interest and
include evidence of the representative's authority to present the claim
on the principal's behalf.
An administrative claim under the AJEA must be presented for
adjudication to the federal agency owning or operating the vessel
causing the damage or injury.10 5 In those cases where government
liability is based on actions other than those flowing from ownership
or operation of an involved vessel, the claim should be presented to
the agency whose act or omission caused or contributed to the
damage. If the claim is mistakenly presented to the wrong federal
agency, Department of Justice regulations require the receiving
agency to forward the claim to the appropriate agency.1 06 Claims
should be presented not later than 18 months after the cause of action
accrues, to provide for the mandatory six month processing time
before the two year statute of limitations under the SAA or PVA
runs.10 7
101Hahn v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Va. 1%3).
1°2Carr v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Va. 1955).
103See L. Jayson, supra note 79, § 319 (eligible claimants). The real party in interest rule
protects a defendant against subsequent suit by parties actually entitled to recover. White Hall
Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1202 (D. Pa. 1974).
'
04See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 750.5 (1993). The term "owner" includes a bailee, lessee, or
mortgagor, but does not include a mortgagee or other person having title for security purposes
only.
10546 U.S.C. app. § 740 (1988).
I28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b) (1991).
10 7See supra note 90.
735oclow 19M
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Courts are not in agreement in their interpretation of how specific
the notice of claim must be to meet the AJEA requirement to
"present" 108 an administrative claim. In two early district court cases
decided soon after passage of the AJEA, the courts required very
little specificity in the notice and required virtually no mention of the
amount of the claim.10 9 The courts in both cases merely looked at the
purpose of the underlying statutory requirement for an administrative
claim-to give the operating agency an opportunity to settle the claim
administratively, 0-and found that the letters presented by the
claimants fulfilled that purpose. The loose standard applied by these
two courts is likely obsolete for two reasons: First, because the
causes of action in both cases arose immediately before enactment of
the AJEA.111 Second, both decisions came down before the 1966
amendments to the FTCA,112 which added the administrative claim
requirement to that statute. Therefore neither the injured parties nor
the courts had any case law defining the "presentment" and "claim"
standards to guide them.
A 1983 decision from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals estab-
lishes a better defined standard for administrative claims. In Keene
Corp. v. United States, "3 a suit by an asbestos manufacturer seeking
contribution or indemnification for a number of asbestosis claims
against it (some of which had been settled, but none of which had
proceeded to judgment), the court held that a claim which demanded
"an amount yet to be determined" failed to satisfy the statutory claim
requirement." 4 The court concluded that because the claim did not
specify the amount of indemnity or contribution it demanded for each
1°SAn admiralty claim is "presented" when a claimant provides the appropriate agency with
written notice of a claim for money damages in a sum certain for loss, damage, or destruction
of property, personal injury or wrongful death. 33 C.F.R. §§ 750.6(a), 750.8(b) (1993).
'09Clark Terminals of Boston v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 59 (D. Mass. 1951) (two letters,
which together named the vessel, generally described the damage, and invited the agency to
attend a joint inspection, constituted an adequate written claim); Portland Tug & Barge Co. v.
United States, 90 F. Supp. 593 (D. Ore. 1949) (letter to MARAD containing notice of damage
to moorage and equipment was adequate).
"°See 1948 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1898, 1901-02.
"IBefore enactment of the AJEA, the plaintiffs causes of action in these two cases would
have been cognizable under the FTCA, which at that time did not contain an administrative
claim requirement. It is to be expected, therefore, that the courts would view liberally any
"claim" presented.
121966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News §§ 2515, et seq.
113700 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1983).
11Id. at 841.
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underlying lawsuit it was inadequate as an administrative claim.115
Finally, the court held that a claim may not merely state a general
basis for liability; it must provide sufficient information to permit the
agency to evaluate the nature and merits of its liability." 6
In contrast to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the Ninth
Circuit appears to have adopted a standard of "minimal notice" for
administrative claims-at least under the FTCA. In Warren v. United
States,1 1 7 for example, the court held that a written statement satisfies
the "claim" requirement under the FTCA if it: 1) describes the injury
in sufficient detail to enable the agency to begin its own investigation,
and 2) states a sum certain for damages. 118
The first prong of the Ninth Circuit's "minimal notice" test, that
the injury need only be described in sufficient detail to permit the
agency to begin its own investigation, is sometimes defended on the
grounds that the claimant has a limited opportunity for discovery of
evidence held by the government before suit is filed. This justification
fails to explain why courts do not require the claimant to present all
relevant information regarding the claimant's actions, precautions,
and damages. The "minimal notice" standard may appeal to a court
seeking a rationale to avoid dismissing an injured party's suit, but it
is unlikely to promote settlement and avoid litigation through the
administrative claims process. Administrative claims procedures, like
all means of alternative dispute resolution, require adequate disclo-
sure of information to determine the extent of liability and damages.
If the claimant fails to provide adequate information to the agency,
settlement becomes less likely.
C. Agency Action upon Presentment of a Claim
Upon presentment of a conforming claim, the agency's claims
adjudicator may deny, compromise, settle, or pay the claim in full.
115Id. ("Where separate claims are aggregated under the FTCA, the claimant must present
the government with a definite damage amount for each claim.") (citing Kantor v. Kahn, 463 F.
Supp. 1160, 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)).1161d.
117724 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
18 1d. at 780; Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1980), clarified on rehearing, 622
F.2d 197 (1980). Recently, there has been some erosion in even the sum certain requirement. In
Thompson v. United States, 749 F. Supp. 299 (D.D.C. 1990), for example, the court held that
the technical failure to state a sum certain did not mandate dismissal where an accompanying
letter provided sufficient information to estimate the value of the claim. Thompson represents
the minority position. Cf. Adkins v. United States, 896 F.2d 1324 (11th Cir. 1990) (dismissing
claim for personal injury where administrative claim failed to state a sum certain for those
injuries).
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Monetary limitations on a settlement authority's power to pay claims
varies among the services. Presently, the Secretary of the Navy is
authorized to pay claims up to $1 million;1 9 the Secretary of the
Army up to $500,000;120 and the Secretary of Transportation up to
$100,000, for claims arising from Coast Guard operations. 21 Claims
for greater amounts may be forwarded to Congress for payment.
When a claim is settled, acceptance of payment by the claimant or the
claimant's representative is conclusive.' 22
To adjudicate a claim, federal agencies generally require that the
claimant provide the following minimum information:' 23 1) complete
identification of the claimant; 2) date, time, and place of the incident
giving rise to the claim; 3) the identity of the government vessel or
personnel involved (if known); 4) description of the facts and circum-
stances of the incident; 5) nature and extent of the loss, injury, or
damage;124 6) sum certain of the amount being claimed; and 7) names
and addresses of all known witnesses. If the original filing fails to
provide sufficient information for the agency to adjudicate the claim
or confirm the value of loss, the claimant may be asked by the agency
to supplement or amend the claim, to bring it into compliance. An
unexcused failure to submit the requested additional information to
support the claim after being requested to do so may result in a later
finding by the court that the claim was inadequate, resulting in
dismissal of the suit.' 25
"910 U.S.C. §§ 7621 et seq. (1988); 32 C.F.R. § 752.2 (1993).
'2010 U.S.C. § 4801 et seq. (1988); 32 C.F.R. § 536 (1993).
12114 U.S.C. § 646 (1988); 33 C.F.R. Part 25 (1993).
'2210 U.S.C. H§ 4806, 7622(d), 9806 (1988); 14 U.S.C. § 646(b) (1988).123To determine the specific requirements of the agency to which a particular claim is to be
presented, consult the agency's published claims procedures. See supra note 97.
124In all cases involving significant damage to vessels or other property, the extent of damage
and cost of repairs is usually established by joint, formal surveys. In claims against the federal
government failure to invite a representative of the relevant federal agency to participate in a
joint survey of the damaged vessel can seriously impede both the administrative claims process
and subsequent litigation. See generally Meadows, Preparing a Ship Collision Case for Trial, 17
Am Jur Trials 501, at § 121 (1970).
12Robinson v. U.S. Navy, 342 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (failure to submit two estimates
and medical documentation rendered filing insufficient to meet requirement to present claim);
Loveli v. Unknown Federal Correction Officers, 595 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1979); Kornbluth v.
Savannah, 398 F. Supp. 1266 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); see also Comment, Claims Against Customs for
Cargo Damage: The Administrative Route-The Path of Least Resistance, 1 U.S.F. Mar. L.J.
119, 127-30 (1989).
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D. Improper Agency Action as a Defense to Defective Claim
Improper acts or omissions by the government may cause a court
to deny a motion to dismiss an injured party's suit for failure or
inability to comply with an administrative claim requirement within
the applicable statute of limitations. The court may reach this result
by ruling that the injured party's apparently defective claim construc-
tively meets the statutory prerequisite to suit, 26 or that the govern-
ment's conduct warrants equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.
In receiving a notice of claim, the government will not be allowed
to profit by failing to provide the claimant with the information
necessary to identify the agency to which the claim should be
presented.12 7 Under such circumstances, the court will hold that the
claim was properly presented. 12 A critical inquiry in such cases will
be whether the government provided what could be construed as legal
advice regarding presentment or adequacy of a claim, 129 or whether it
merely provided the factual information regarding the proper agency
to which the claim should be directed. 13 0 It could be argued from Carr
v. United States and cases like it that failure to provide a claimant
with factual information necessary to present a claim will bar the
government from asserting those fact-based defects as a defense. 3
Equitable tolling provides a second means of avoiding dismissal of
an untimely complaint. Courts have long held that the United States
may not be equitably estopped from asserting as a defense to a suit
insufficiency of the plaintiff's administrative claim.1 32 And, until
recently, courts would not equitably toll the statute of limitations in
federal waiver of immunity statutes. 33 However, in 1990, the Su-
126Alternatively, the court may simply lower the standard which claims must meet, as the
Ninth Circuit did. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
127Cart v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 527, 533 (E.D. Va. 1955).
128Id. Note that the Department of Justice regulations require that federal agencies forward
misdirected claims to the correct agency. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b) (1993).
129Agency personnel are restricted in the type of assistance they may provide claimants and
their representatives. Generally, such assistance is limited to information on how to present a
claim, the address to which it should be sent, and the supporting documentation required. See
18 U.S.C. § 205 (1988) (no officer or employee of the federal government may act as agent or
attorney for another in prosecution of any. claim against the United States).
1
'"In the former case, the court may deem the presentment requirement met. In the latter
case, the court will likely not deem a claim "presented" merely because the claimant complains
that he was given inadequate "legal" advice by the agency claims official.
131The agency's own claims processing manuals may be examined by the court in
determining whether the agency acted properly. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 750.8(b) (1993) (U.S.
Navy requirement that an "insufficient" claim be returned to the party who submitted it).
132Burns v. United States, 764 F.2d 722, 724 (9th Cir. 1985).
133Id. at 724.
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preme Court swept aside that practice, and created a rebuttable
presumption that equitable tolling applies to suits against the United
States unless the applicable waiver of immunity statute specifically
provides otherwise.1 34 Potential situations which may justify equita-
ble tolling include those in which the agency failed to notify the
claimant of fatal defects in his claim, or in which the claimant was
misled by agency claims processing officials into believing that the
FTCA claims procedures and tolling provisions applied to the claim-
ant's cause of action.
Because tolling is an equitable remedy which potentially enlarges
the federal government's waiver of sovereign immunity, courts will
likely be circumspect in reviewing any petition for relief, and will
grant such relief only where the balance of equities clearly justifies it.
In conducting the balancing, one would expect that a claimant who
was represented by legal counsel would be less likely to be granted
relief than would an unrepresented claimant who relied on agency
claims personnel for guidance.135
CONCLUSION
Major vessel casualties, particularly those which result in signifi-
cant pollution by oil or hazardous substances, can spawn a number of
suits by parties who suffer injury or damage ashore. Even though the
injury or damage in such cases was "caused by a vessel," acts or
omissions by other parties may have contributed to the casualty.
Failure to recognize that the AJEA unavoidably provides admiralty
jurisdiction over suits against those whose shore-based negligence
contributed to the casualty can have devastating consequences,
particularly if the responsible party is the federal government and no
administrative claim was filed.
Until Congress resolves the existing statutory hodge-podge by
establishing common minimum standards for administrative claims
which must be met before any suit can be brought against the
government, including those arising directly under the Suits in
Admiralty Act and the Public Vessels Act, injured parties have two
options. They may carefully study the relevant statutory waivers of
sovereign immunity, attempt to determine which one controls their
cause of action, then comply with the minimum requirements of that
134Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 112 L.Ed.2d 435, 444 (1990).
135See, e.g., Loeber v. Bay Tankers, Inc., 924 F.2d 1340, 1344 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 78 (1991) (representation by counsel one factor in court's decision to deny tolling).
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statute and hope the court later agrees with their reasoning. Or they
can pursue a more cautious course by filing an administrative claim in
all such cases, adhering to the following standards:
1. The claim should be presented not later than 18 months after the
cause of action accrues.
2. The claim should be presented to the agency which owns or
operates the vessel which caused the injury or damage or, if a
government vessel was not involved, the agency whose conduct may
have contributed to the injury or damage.
3. The claim must be written. Claims need not be on any particular
form; however, the Standard Form 95 is nearly always used.
4. The claim must be presented in the name of the real party in
interest and signed by that party or an authorized agent or attorney.
5. The claim must be for a sum certain.
6. The claim should provide an adequate description of the cause
of action (including the date, location, nature, and extent of injury or
damage) to permit the agency to conduct an investigation.
7. Any claim for contribution or indemnification should itemize
each settled claim and/or judgment.
The prudent attorney will also examine the claims procedures
published by the agency to which the claim will be presented and seek
additional guidance from the agency claims office when necessary to
resolve ambiguities or conflicts.
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